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Abstract
Background: As countries reform health financing systems towards universal health coverage, increasing concerns 
emerge on the need to ensure inclusion of the most vulnerable segments of society, working to counteract existing 
inequities in service coverage. To this end, selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa have decided to couple 
performance-based financing (PBF) with demand-side equity measures. Still, evidence on the equity impacts of these 
more complex PBF models is largely lacking. We aimed at filling this gap in knowledge by assessing the equity impact 
of PBF combined with equity measures on utilization of maternal health services in Burkina Faso.
Methods: Our study took place in 24 districts in rural Burkina Faso. We implemented an experimental design (cluster-
randomized trial) nested within a quasi-experimental one (pre- and post-test design with independent controls). 
Our analysis relied on self-reported data on pregnancy history from 9999 (baseline) and 11 010 (endline) women of 
reproductive age (15-49 years) on use of maternal healthcare and reproductive health services, and estimated effects 
using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, purposely focused on identifying program effects among the 
poorest wealth quintile.
Results: PBF improved the utilization of few selected maternal health services compared to status quo service 
provision. These benefits, however, were not accrued by the poorest 20%, but rather by the other quintiles. PBF 
combined with equity measures did not produce better or more equitable results than standard PBF, with specific 
differences only on selected outcomes.
Conclusion: Our findings challenge the notion that implementing equity measures alongside PBF is sufficient to 
produce an equitable distribution in program benefits and point at the need to identify more innovative and context-
sensitive measures to ensure adequate access to care for the poorest. Our findings also highlight the importance of 
considering changing policy environments and the need to assess interferences across policies.
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Implications for policy makers
• Our study detects no clear added benefit of the equity measures implemented in conjunction with PBF compared to stand-alone performance-
based financing (PBF).  
• The experience of the PBF program in Burkina Faso provides a clear illustration of how even well-intended and accurately designed interventions 
may fail to achieve their objective due to a variety of contextual elements that shape implementation in unattended manners.
• Greater attention to context and competing policies ought to be paid in designing strategies that aim at building synergies between supply and 
demand to overcome existing inequities.
Implications for the public
Performance-based financing (PBF) is being implemented across sub-Saharan Africa, as a presumed means of strengthening health systems 
performance, but concerns persist that PBF may reinforce instead of counteracting existing inequalities in access to and utilization of health services. 
As such, selected countries are coupling PBF with targeted demand-side interventions aimed at increasing access for the most vulnerable segments 
of the population. Yet evidence on the effects of these combined interventions is extremely limited. The study investigated the equity impact of PBF 
combined with equity measures on utilization of maternal health services. Our findings show that PBF combined with equity measures does not lead 
to improved equity in utilization of maternal health services and points at the need to carefully consider the context and complementary policies so 
as to build synergies between demand and supply in order to reduce inequities in maternal health services utilization.
Key Messages 
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Background 
There is a growing concern that health inequalities related 
to social determinants of health are responsible for the slow 
progress witnessed in health and healthcare at global, regional 
and country levels, potentially jeopardizing opportunities to 
achieve the health related Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).1 As countries embark on health financing and 
service delivery reforms, often targeting women and children 
first, monitoring health and healthcare inequalities remains 
an essential element of tracking progress towards the SDG 
3 target of achieving universal health coverage by 2030, 
ensuring that no one is left behind.2 Monitoring is even more 
urgent and important in low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) because, despite the recent progress made in curbing 
maternal and child deaths, serious inequities in maternal 
and child health persist, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.3 
Exacerbating the situation, LMICs also face huge coverage 
gaps, health system inefficiencies, and insufficient quality of 
service delivery.4 
In recent years, much attention has been paid to 
performance-based financing (PBF) as a possible strategy to 
improve health system performance. PBF aims at reorienting 
health providers’ behavior towards provision of more and 
better quality care through the implementation of performance 
contracts that reward the attainment of predefined targets.5 
One vividly debated program design topic is a PBF programs’ 
potential to reinforce rather than to counteract existing 
inequities.6,7 Still, very few studies have looked at the equity 
impact of PBF on health services use and maternal care 
services in particular. While some studies suggest pro-least 
poor effects,8,9 others find evidence for the opposite10 or 
distributional-neutral effects.11,12 Given the mixed evidence, 
an increasing number of authors advocate the introduction of 
PBF designs deliberately aimed at spreading program benefits 
more evenly across wealth groups.8,11,12 However, to date 
limited evidence is available.13 
Our study evaluates an “equity-conscious” PBF design, 
which was recently implemented in Burkina Faso and which 
was piloted with 3 different equity measures. We examined 
program effects on maternal health service utilization and 
defined equity as equal access given equal need, with access 
measured as reported service use and need,14 measured in 
terms of a woman’s pregnancy status. 
Methods 
Study Setting 
Burkina Faso is a landlocked West African country with a 
population of 18.6 million and a life expectancy of 60 years. 
Infant and under-five mortality rates stand respectively 
at 61 and 89 deaths per 1000 live births. An estimated 41.1 
percent of the population live below the national poverty 
line of US$1.90 a day. Maternal mortality remains high at 
an estimated 371 per 100 000 live births. Multiple challenges 
related to maternal care persist, including serious inequities 
in access linked to sub-standard quality, low geographical 
accessibility, and financial barriers.15
Prior to PBF, Burkina Faso undertook several health 
financing reforms to increase coverage and reduce inequities 
in access to and utilization of maternal health services, such as 
removal of user fees for antenatal care (ANC) services in 2002, 
and an 80% removal of user fees for delivery care in 2007, with 
a provision for full exemption of the ultra-poor.16 Later in 
2016, with the introduction of national free healthcare policy, 
known as the gratuité, the government removed all user fees 
for services delivered to children under the age of 5 years and 
to pregnant and lactating women.17 As described below, the 
introduction of the national free healthcare policy induced 
the Ministry of Health to modify PBF prices, specifically to 
remove the equity measure additional payments (implemented 
in PBF2 and PBF3) for selected services targeted by both the 
national free healthcare policy and the PBF program.18
The Intervention and the Study Design 
Following an initial pilot in the districts of Titao, Leo, and 
Boulsa, starting in January 2014, Burkina Faso piloted PBF 
combined with different equity interventions in 12 districts 
distributed across 6 regions (Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre-
Nord, Centre-Ouest, Nord, Sud-Ouest, Centre-Est) in which 
health facilities were rewarded by the Ministry of Health 
for achievement of defined health service indicators using a 
case-based payment system, adjusted for quality of care after 
verification. More details on the intervention design have 
been described elsewhere.18 In brief, PBF was implemented 
according to 4 different models, 3 of which included an 
equity intervention targeting specifically the ultra-poor, as 
summarized in Table 1. The details of the ultra-poor selection 
process have been described elsewhere.19,20
Policy-makers expected the equity measures to induce 
increased utilization among the ultra-poor through 4 different 
pathways. First, they assumed that the targeting process would 
sensitize communities and particularly the targeted ultra-
poor to the importance of health service utilization in case of 
need. Second, they assumed that the equity component would 
sensitize health workers to the importance of making specific 
efforts to facilitate health service utilization among the ultra-
poor. Third, the removal of user fees for the targeted ultra-
poor was assumed to reduce barriers to healthcare utilization 
among the ultra-poor. And finally, the elevated price levels 
for treating the targeted ultra-poor patients were assumed to 
enable and motivate health facilities to provide services to the 
ultra-poor free of charge. 
To address our study primary objective of measuring 
the equity impact of PBF combined with equity measures 
compared to standard PBF alone, we inevitably needed to 
investigate the effect of PBF compared to status-quo service 
provision in the first place. To do so, we adopted a design that 
combined experimental with quasi-experimental elements. 
More specifically, we conducted a cluster-randomized trial 
nested within a pre-and post-test study with independent 
controls. Hereafter, we describe the different elements of our 
study in detail, referring to the quasi-experiment as study 
component 1 and to the cluster-randomized trial as study 
component 2. Figure provides a summary of the details of 
both study components including final sample sizes used in 
the analysis.
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Table 1. PBF Models and Their Description
PBF Model Description
Standard PBF (PBF1)
Performance contracts based on case-based payments method adjusted for quality were signed between the Ministry of 
Health and health facilities. Verification agencies were employed to verify service provision data submitted by individual 
facilities. PBF unit prices were calculated based on the relative cost and frequency of the services provided. Additional 
incentives were calculated on the basis of quantity outcomes and service quality if facilities achieved a quality score of 
50% (and later changed to 60%), every quarter. Incentives were expected to pay for expenditures incurred, to increase 
savings and to pay bonuses to individual staff members.
PBF1 plus systematic targeting 
and subsidization of health 
services for the ultra-poor 
(PBF2)
Used the same health service purchasing model as PBF1, but had specific equity measures meant to ease access to 
and utilization of maternal healthcare services among the ultra-poor living in the catchment areas of the participating 
health facilities with the following components: (a) a systematic targeting of the ultra-poor to identify a maximum of 
poorest 20% of the population; (b) providing the identified ultra-poor with proof of status so they could access health 
services at no cost at the point of use; and (c) higher purchase unit prices than in PBF1 for health services delivered to 
the targeted ultra-poor (ie, as compensation for the lost revenues due to free health services provided to the ultra-poor 
at the point of use). The adjusted higher unit prices were only for services where user fees existed, such as tetanus 
toxoid vaccine, delivery and family planning services among others, while for services already provided free of charge at 
point of use, such as HIV and tuberculosis testing and treatment among others, the same unit prices as in standard PBF 
were used. The additional payments were removed in June 2016 after the introduction of the national free healthcare 
policy.
PBF2 combined with higher 
incentive purchase price to 
provide health services to the 
ultra-poor (PBF3)
Used the same purchasing arrangement as PBF1 and PBF2 and also involved the same targeting mechanisms and equity 
measures for the ultra-poor as in PBF2. The main difference was in the unit prices, whereby services provided to the 
ultra-poor were reimbursed at a higher unit price than in PBF2—at around 150% of the PBF2 unit prices. The higher unit 
prices were meant to compensate for the lost revenue from user fees, and also to offer health workers an additional 
incentive to motivate them to attract or reach out to the ultra-poor. This applied only to services where user fees were 
still charged at the point of use. These additional payment were removed in June 2016 after the introduction of the 
national free healthcare policy.
PBF1 plus community-based 
health insurance, combined 
with targeting and subsidization 
of health services for the ultra-
poor (PBF4)
Involved implementation of PBF1 alongside CBHI whereby an annual insurance premium of 3900 F CFA (US$7) per 
individual was offered for the whole population using the same targeting mechanism as in PBF2 and PBF3. CBHI 
insurance premiums for the ultra-poor was fully paid for by the PBF program and payments to health facilities were 
made by both the CBHI scheme as a replacement for user fees and by the PBF program, using a case-based payment 
system as in PBF1.
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; CBHI, Community-based health insurance.
Study Component 1
For the study component 1, six regions (Boucle du Mouhoun, 
Centre-Nord, Centre-Ouest, Nord, Sud-Ouest, Centre-Est) 
were identified non-randomly by the government and its 
development partners as intervention regions. Within each 
region, 2 districts were selected as intervention districts, ie, 
destined to receive PBF, and 2 districts (when not possible in 
a neighbouring region) as control, ie, continue with status quo 
service provision with no PBF. The intervention districts were 
purposely selected based on poor performance on selected 
maternal health indicators.18 Control districts were selected 
to be as similar as possible (also in terms of performance on 
maternal health indicators) to intervention districts. This 
study component was set to allow a comparison between 
PBF districts (12) and districts (12) with status quo service 
provision without PBF. Since the intervention was assigned 
at district levels, districts effectively functioned as clusters for 
this study component. 
Study Component 2
For the study component 2, ten out of 12 districts (2 with 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) where CBHI 
was pre-existing to allow implementation) were targeted 
by the Ministry of Health and development partners for 
randomization due to financial constraints (not enough 
funds to allow targeting across all 12 selected districts once 
calculations for targeting costs were made). In 8 out of 10 
targeted districts in 4 regions (Centre-East, Centre-Nord, 
Sud-Ouest, Nord), clusters (primary healthcare facilities) 
were randomized to receive either PBF1 or PBF combined 
with either one of 2 equity measures, PBF2, and PBF3 so as 
to test the additional effect of combining standard PBF with 
equity measures as one way of reducing inequities in access to 
and utilization of health services. 
Randomization took place within the framework of public 
randomization ceremonies in which concerned district and 
regions took turns in drawing primary healthcare facility 
names from a box containing all primary healthcare facility 
names in the 4 regions (Centre-East, Centre-Nord, Sud-
Ouest, Nord) starting with the selection of pre-defined PBF 
model, and followed by the assignment of primary healthcare 
facilities in the order in which they were drawn from the box.18 
For example, in the 8 districts of the 4 regions (Centre-East, 
Centre-Nord, Sud-Ouest, Nord), this was done as follows: 
first facility: PBF1, second facility: PBF2; third facility: PBF3, 
fourth facility: PBF1, fifth facility: PBF2; and sixth facility: 
PBF3; etc. In these 8 districts of the 4 regions (Centre-East, 
Centre-Nord, Sud-Ouest, Nord) concerned by the three-arm 
randomization, this resulted into samples of 90 PBF1 facilities, 
83 PBF2 facilities, and 84 PBF3 facilities. In the Boucle du 
Mouhoun region where 2 districts already implementing 
CBHI were targeted, 59 facilities were randomized to receive 
either PBF1 or PBF4 (following the same procedure outlined 
above), generating samples of 29 PBF1 and 30 PBF4 facilities. 
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Figure. Summary of Study Designs and Sampling Procedures. Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
The 18 facilities which had been implementing CBHI prior 
to the launch of the study were excluded from randomization 
and hence from our study. Nevertheless, for ethical reasons, 
these facilities all implemented PBF in addition to CBHI. 
This study component was set to allow us to measure the 
benefit of combining PBF with an equity measure compared 
to implementing standard PBF on its own. In particular, we 
used this experimental component to measure the additional 
equity effects of PBF2, PBF3, and PBF4 compared to PBF1.
Sampling and Data Sources 
For both study components, we used repeated cross-sectional 
household survey data collected at baseline from November 
2013-March 2014 and at endline from April-June 2017. 
Sampling followed a three-stage cluster sampling procedure. 
First, for each primary healthcare facility included in the 
study (416 in intervention districts and 117 in the control 
districts — the number of facilities included in the study is 
larger for intervention compared to control districts since in 
intervention districts, we took a census of all facilities while 
in control districts we randomly selected one third of all 
facilities), we randomly selected one village. Second, within 
each village, we randomly selected 15 out of all households 
identified in each village where at least one woman was 
pregnant or had completed a pregnancy in the prior 24 
months (inclusion criteria). Third, within a household, we 
interviewed all women of reproductive age (15-49 years), 
irrespective of whether they had a recent history of pregnancy. 
The survey collected information on use of reproductive 
and maternal health services from women of reproductive 
age (15-49 years). Data on use of family planning were 
collected from all women of reproductive age regardless of 
marital status while data on use of maternal health services 
were collected only from women with a recent pregnancy. At 
baseline in study component 1, our sample comprised 9999 
(7766 in intervention group, 2233 in control group) women 
of reproductive age (15-49 years) of whom 6568 (5074 in 
intervention group, 1494 in control group) had completed 
pregnancy 24 months prior to the survey. For the study 
component 2, at baseline, our sample comprised 6292 (1730 
in PBF1, 1602 in PBF2, 1606 in PBF3 in the 4 regions [Centre-
East, Centre-Nord, Sud-Ouest, Nord] and 521in PBF1 and 
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833 in PBF4 in Boucle du Mouhoun) women of reproductive 
age (15-49 years) of whom 4052 (1112 in PBF1, 970 in PBF2, 
1026 in PBF3 in the 4 regions [Centre-East, Centre-Nord, 
Sud-Ouest, Nord] and 363 in PBF1 and 581 in PBF4 in Boucle 
du Mouhoun) had completed pregnancy 24 months prior to 
the survey. At endline, in study component 1, our sample 
comprised 11 010 (8432 in intervention group, 2578 in control 
group) women of reproductive age (15-49 years) of whom 
6371 (4932 in intervention group, 1439 in control group) had 
completed pregnancy 24 months prior to the survey. For the 
study component 2, at endline, our sample comprised 6856 
(1884 in PBF1, 1722 in PBF2, 1752 in PBF3 in the 4 regions 
[Centre-East, Centre-Nord, Sud-Ouest, Nord], and 570 in 
PBF1 and 928 in PBF4 in Boucle du Mouhoun) women of 
reproductive age (15-49 years) of whom 4065 (1099 in PBF1, 
983 in PBF2, 1010 in PBF3 in the 4 regions [Centre-East, 
Centre-Nord, Sud-Ouest, Nord], and 368 in PBF1 and 605 in 
PBF4 in Boucle du Mouhoun) had completed pregnancy 24 
months prior to the survey.
Variables and Their Measurement
Table 2 summarizes all outcomes and control variables. Our 
outcomes were selected to capture service coverage (defined 
as utilization given need, ie, pregnancy status) along the 
reproductive and maternal health service continuum and to 
reflect services which were incentivized by the PBF program, 
namely: ANC in the first trimester, at least 4 antenatal care 
(ANC4+) visits, at least 2 doses of tetanus toxoid vaccine 
(TTV2+), iron supplementation, HIV testing in pregnancy, 
facility-based delivery, at least 1 postnatal care (PNC1+) visit, 
at least 3 postnatal care (PNC3+) visits, and modern family 
planning methods (female sterilization, male sterilization, 
intrauterine device [IUD]/spiral, injectables/depoprovera, 
implants/norplant, male condom, female condom, 
diaphragm, foam/jelly). To improve the estimation precision, 
we included a number of control variables, which have the 
potential to explain the variation in outcome indicators from 
our previous work.21 We relied on multiple correspondence 
analysis — run separately on baseline and endline samples —
Table 2. Variables and their measurement
Measurement
Outcome variables
ANC visit in the first trimester
1 = Attended first antenatal care consultation within the first trimester
0 = Attended first antenatal care consultation later than first trimester
At least 4 ANC visits (ANC4+)
1 = Attended at least 4 antenatal care consultations
0 = Attended less than 4 antenatal care consultations
At least 2 doses of tetanus toxoid 
vaccine (TTV2+)
1 = Received at least 2 tetanus doses during pregnancy
0 = Received less than 2 doses during pregnancy
HIV testing in pregnancy 
1 = Received HIV testing during pregnancy
0 = Did not receive HIV testing during pregnancy
Iron supplementation  
1 = Received iron supplements during pregnancy
0 = Did not receive iron supplements during pregnancy
Facility-based delivery 
1 = Delivered at a formal health facility
0 = Did not deliver at a formal health facility
At least 1 postnatal care visit (PNC1+)
1 = Attended at least one postnatal care consultation within 6 weeks post-delivery
0 = Did not attend any postnatal care consultations within 6 weeks post-delivery 
At least 3 postnatal care visits (PNC3+)
1 = Attended at least 3 postnatal care consultations within 6 weeks post-delivery 
0 = Attended less than 3 postnatal care consultations within 6 weeks post-delivery 
Modern family planninga 
1 = Used any modern family planning method
0 = Used no or traditional family planning method
Control variables
Household wealth
0 = Lowest 20%
1 = Upper 80%
Marital status 
0 = Unmarried 
1 = Married
Literacy 
0 = Illiterate
1 = Literate
Age 
0 = 15-20 years
1 = >21 years 
Parity 
0 =  0-3 pregnancies
1 =  ≥4 pregnancies
Distance to catchment health centre
0 =  >5 km to catchment health centre
1 =  ≤5 km to catchment health centre
Abbreviations: ANC, antenatal care; TTV, tetanus toxoid vaccine; PNC, postnatal care.
a Includes female sterilization, male sterilization, intrauterine device (IUD)/spiral, injectables/depoprovera, implants/norplant, male condom, female condom, 
diaphragm, foam/jelly.
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to generate a wealth index based on asset ownership and 
dwelling characteristics.22 Given our specific research focus 
and the intervention’s intention to treat the ultra-poor23 and 
in line with prior literature,8 we divided households in 2 
wealth brackets corresponding to the Lowest 20% (ie, ultra-
poor) and the rest — Upper 80%.
Data Analysis 
Bivariate Analysis
First, we used t tests to assess systematic differences in the 
distribution of Outcome variables and Control variables 
across study arms for both study components.
Regression Analysis
Second, to assess the overall impact of PBF compared to status 
quo, we relied on study component 1 and used a difference-
in-differences (DID) estimation approach,24 comparing 
intervention districts (irrespective of specific study arm) 
with control districts. We estimated a linear probability 
model, where we clustered standard errors at district level. In 
addition, for each outcome, we included village fixed effects 
and several individual-level covariates (equation 1):
. 17 . .[ 17 ] .dvit v t d d t it dvitY Y PBF PBF Yα β β λ δ+= + + ∗ + Χ + ε    (1)
where Ydvit outcome for individual i from village v in district 
d at time t with t as (baseline, endline); Y17t is dummy variable 
representing endline; PBFd is dummy variable denoting 
PBF exposure (1 = PBF, 0 = control); αv is village fixed effects 
capturing time-invariant unobserved differences across 
villages. Xit is vector of individual-level covariates; and εdvit 
is error term. λ is the variable of interest (interaction term 
between PBF and endline) that gives the DID estimate for the 
effect of being located in a PBF district.
To determine overall PBF effects compared to status quo by 
socio-economic status group, we estimated regression model 
1 by wealth bracket, following Lannes et al.8 
Third, to answer our key question on the equity impact of 
the PBF models integrating equity interventions, we relied 
exclusively on study component 2 of our study (10 districts) 
and also used DID to estimate a linear probability model as in 
equation 1, but with standard errors clustered at village level 
where randomization occurred. In this study component, 
equation 2 and equation 3 pertain, respectively, to the 8 
districts in 4 regions (Centre-East, Centre-Nord, Sud-Ouest, 
Nord) where PBF1, PBF2, and PBF3 were randomized and to 
the 2 districts in Boucle du Mouhoun region where PBF1 and 
PBF4 were randomized:
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌 + 𝛽𝛽. 𝑌𝑌17𝑌𝑌 + 𝛽𝛽. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2𝑌𝑌 + 𝜆𝜆2. [𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2𝑌𝑌 ∗ 𝑌𝑌17𝑌𝑌] + 
𝛽𝛽. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃3𝑌𝑌 + 𝜆𝜆3. [𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃3𝑌𝑌 ∗ 𝑌𝑌17𝑌𝑌] + 𝛿𝛿. 𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝜀𝜀𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌       
 
                                                                                                      (2)
  
4. 17 . 4 .[ 4 17 ] .vit v t v v t it vitY Y PBF PBF Y Xα β β λ δ= + + + ∗ + + ε     (3)
where Yvit is outcome for individual i from village v at time t 
with t as (baseline, endline) in the intervention districts. λ2 and 
λ3 are variables of interest that give the DID estimates for the 
effects of being resident in PBF2 and PBF3 compared to PBF1, 
respectively, and λ4 is the variable of interest that give the DID 
estimate for the effect of being resident in PBF4 compared to 
PBF1 in the Boucle du Mouhoun region.
Similarly to what we described earlier, to estimate specific 
effects by socio-economic status, we performed separate 
analyses by wealth bracket.8
Furthermore, for study component 1, we performed several 
robustness checks to account for the small number of clusters 
(24 districts). We did so in light of the existing literature 
suggesting that: (1) a small number of clusters results in a 
higher likelihood of estimating downwards-biased standard 
errors, potentially leading to over rejection of the null 
hypothesis, ie, suggesting significant program impact while in 
reality there is none or very little impact25; and (2) bias arising 
from a small number of clusters is more acute in situations 
characterized by an imbalance in cluster sample sizes.26 
Hence, to account for these 2 problems pertaining to our 
study component 1, we relied on the ‘wild bootstrap’ method 
for the related analyses. This method relies on a bootstrap t- 
procedure instead of bootstrapping the standard errors.25 
We performed all analyses using Stata14 (Stata Corporation, 
Texas, USA).
Results
The results of our study are presented according to study 
components as follows:
Study Component 1
Bivariate Analysis
Tables 3 and 4 shows bivariate analysis of the characteristics 
of women of reproductive age (15-49 years) and coverage of 
maternal health services at baseline, respectively. At baseline, 
women in intervention and control districts were comparable 
on most demographic characteristics except age (Table 3). 
In contrast, significant differences between PBF and control 
group existed in baseline values for a number of outcome 
variables: ANC4+ visits, HIV testing in pregnancy, facility-
based delivery, PNC1+ visit and PNC3+ visits (Table 4).
Regression Analysis
Table 5 summarizes the results of the regression models 
pertaining to the overall impact of PBF compared to status 
quo, both for the entire sample and stratified by socio-
economic group for the study component 1. We detected a 
positive effect of PBF on utilization of facility-based delivery 
[4.4 percentage points (pp) (P < .1)] and for PNC3+ visits: 
[6.6 pp (P < .1)]. This effect was primarily driven by an effect 
among the upper 80% of 5.5 pp (P < .05) and of 7.2 pp (P < .1) 
for facility-based delivery and PNC3+ visits, respectively. 
Among the poorest 20%, we detected an increase attributable 
to PBF for utilization of modern family planning methods of 
7.6 pp (P < .1).
Table 6 summarizes the results of the robustness tests —
using the “wild bootstrap” method.25 The results show that 
the estimates included in this study were all within the 95% 
confidence interval, and as such, there is no concern that the 
DID estimates in this study component are substantially biased 
due to the small number of clusters and/or to imbalances in 
Mwase et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–15 7
Table 3. Comparison of Women Characteristics Between PBF and Control Samples at Baseline
PBF vs Control
Control Variable
Total PBF Control
Difference
N = 9999 Mean (%) Mean (%) Mean (%)
Age
15-20 years 1918 19.18 20.10 15.99
4.11***
>21 years 8081 80.82 79.90 84.01
Literacy
Literacy 1320 13.20 13.21 13.17
0.05
Illiteracy 8679 86.80 86.79 86.83
Parity
0-3 pregnancies 5911 59.12 59.46 57.90
1.56
≥4 pregnancies 4088 40.88 40.54 42.10
Marital status
Married 9431 94.32 94.48 93.78
0.70
Unmarried 568 5.68 5.52 6.22
Distance
1 ≤5 km 6097 60.98 61.47 59.25
2.23
0 = >5 km 3902 39.02 38.53 40.75
Wealth groups
Lowest 20% 1765 17.65 17.37 18.63
-1.26
Upper 80% 8234 82.35 82.63 81.37
Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
T test for differences between PBF and control samples;  *** P < .01.
Table 4. Comparison of Utilization of Maternal Health Services Between PBF and Control Samples at Baseline and Endline
Outcome Variable
Baseline Endline
Total PBF Control
Difference
Total PBF Control
Difference
n Mean (%) n
Mean 
(%) n
Mean 
(%) n
Mean 
(%) n
Mean 
(%) n
Mean 
(%)
ANC 1st trimester 6357 67.17 4909 67.39 1448 66.44 0.95 6168 73.98 4773 75.63 1395 68.32 7.31***
ANC4+a visits 6564 44.20 5070 44.91 1494 41.77 3.14** 6365 61.62 4928 62.50 1437 58.59 3.91***
TTV2+b 6557 62.80 5065 62.65 1492 63.34 -0.69*** 6213 43.68 4810 43.10 1403 45.69 -2.59*
HIV testing in pregnancy 6557 56.11 5065 57.14 1492 52.61 4.53 6215 54.88 4812 56.44 1403 49.54 6.90***
Iron supplementation 6557 93.18 5065 92.99 1492 93.83 -0.84 6209 98.20 4807 98.25 1402 98.00 0.25
Facility-based delivery 6511 89.08 5024 88.42 1487 91.32 -2.90*** 6220 91.27 4807 91.72 1413 89.74 1.98**
PNC1+c visit 6488 53.21 5002 54.48 1486 48.92 5.56*** 6194 76.40 4785 77.93 1409 71.19 6.74***
PNC3+d visits 6488 5.50 5002 4.96 1486 7.34 -2.38*** 6194 13.63 4785 14.48 1409 10.72 3.76***
Modern planning family 
methods 8643 11.25 6814 11.43 1829 10.55 0.88 8942 27.25 6806 27.80 2136 25.51 2.29
Abbreviations: TTV, tetanus toxoid vaccine; PNC, postnatal care; PBF, performance-based financing; ANC, Antenatal care.
a At least 4 antenatal care; b At least 2 tetanus doses during pregnancy; c At least one postnatal care visit within 6 weeks; d At least 3 postnatal care visits within 
6 weeks
T test for differences between PBF and control samples; * P < .1, ** P < .05, *** P < .01.
cluster sample sizes. These results imply that we are not at risk 
of detecting an effect as significant when there was in fact no 
effect.
Study Component 2
Bivariate Analysis
Tables 7 and 8 presents bivariate analysis of the characteristics 
of women of reproductive age (15-49 years) and coverage of 
maternal health services, respectively at baseline in PBF2, 
PBF3 and PBF1 in the 4 regions (Centre-East, Centre-
Nord, Sud-Ouest, Nord) and PBF4 and PBF1 in Boucle du 
Mouhoun region. At baseline, women across the 4 PBF arms 
were comparable except for marital status, distance to primary 
healthcare facilities, and age (Table 7).
The random allocation of facilities to the 4 PBF intervention 
arms resulted in uniform allocation for the majority of the 
outcome variables intervention arms, and utilization of most 
maternal care services increased over time with the exception 
of TTV2+ (Table 8).
Regression Analysis
Table 9 summarizes the results of the regression models 
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aimed at estimating the additional benefit of PBF2, PBF3, and 
PBF4 compared to PBF1 for study component 2. Only PBF4 
appeared to produce additional benefits, with significant 
positive effects on TTV2+ by 13.1pp (P < .05) and iron 
supplementation by 6.2 pp (P < .05) over and above PBF1. 
PBF2 performed worse than PBF1 in terms of its effect on 
utilization of TTV2+ by 6.8 pp (P < .1), while PBF3 had 
negative additional effects on facility-based delivery by 3.8 pp 
(P < .1) and PNC1+ visit by 6.7 pp (P < .1) respectively.
Table 10 represents the core of our analysis, as it summarizes 
the results of the regression models aimed at estimating the 
additional benefit of PBF2, PBF3, and PBF4 compared to 
PBF1 by socio-economic subgroup for study component 
2. Similar to the overall findings presented in Table 9, the 
equity measures that accompanied the implementation of 
PBF did not result in any additional benefit for the poorest 
20%, but rather the opposite on certain indicators. PBF2 
and PBF3 decreased utilization of facility-based delivery by 
11.7 pp (P < .05) and 11.8 pp (P < .05), respectively among 
the poorest 20%. In addition, PBF3 decreased utilization of 
iron supplementation by 7.4 pp (P < .05) and modern family 
planning methods by 12.7 pp (P < .05) among the poorest 
20%, while PBF4 decreased utilization of PNC1+ visit by 
24.1 pp (P < .05) among the poorest 20%. The overall positive 
additional effect of PBF4 on TTV2+ and iron supplementation 
coverage (seen in Table 9) was present only among the upper 
80%, with an increase of 13.7 pp (P < .05) and 7.6 pp (P < .05) 
respectively, but not among the poorest 20%.
Discussion 
This study makes a unique contribution to the literature by 
combining experimental and quasi-experimental elements to 
investigate not only the overall impact of PBF on maternal 
health service coverage, but specifically the role of combining 
equity interventions with standard PBF to reduce existing 
inequities.
Unfortunately, the results do not correspond to what 
policy-makers and their development partners had intended 
to achieve when designing the intervention and even yield 
Table 5. DID Estimates of Overall PBF Impacts on the Utilization of Maternal Health Services Compared to Status Quo in the Entire Population as Well as by Wealth 
Subgroups
Outcome Variable
Full Sample
Wealth Subgroups
Lowest 20% Upper 80%
Beta Robust Standard Error Beta Robust Standard Error Beta Robust Standard Error
ANC 1st trimester 0.057 0.056 0.031 0.053 0.059 0.056
ANC4+a visits -0.004 0.041 0.037 0.067 -0.022 0.037
TTV2+b -0.027 0.063 0.026 0.054 -0.025 0.068
HIV testing in pregnancy 0.001 0.063 0.047 0.092 -0.011 0.060
Iron supplementation 0.012 0.019 0.015 0.034 0.009 0.017
Facility-based delivery 0.044* 0.022 0.022 0.038 0.055** 0.020
PNC1+c visit 0.030 0.064 -0.006 0.096 0.047 0.062
PNC3+d visits 0.066* 0.036 0.041 0.042 0.072* 0.038
Modern family planning methods 0.019 0.024 0.076* 0.040 0.011 0.025
Abbreviations: TTV, tetanus toxoid vaccine; PNC, postnatal care; DID, difference-in-differences; PBF, performance-based financing; ANC, antenatal care.
a At least 4 antenatal care; b At least 2 tetanus doses during pregnancy; c At least one postnatal care visit within 6 weeks; d At least 3 postnatal care visits within 
6 weeks. * P < .1, ** P < .05.
Table 6. Results of “Wild Bootstrap” Method
Outcome Variable Full Sample
Wealth Subgroups
Lowest 20% Upper 80%
ANC first trimester
DID estimate 0.057 0.031 0.059
Wild bootstrap CI-left -0.031 -0.012 -0.036
Wild bootstrap CI-right 0.173 0.130 0.183
ANC4+a visits
DID estimate -0.004 -0.037 -0.022
Wild bootstrap CI-left -0.047 -0.030 -0.052
Wild bootstrap CI-right 0.124 0.166 0.134
TTV2+b
DID estimate -0.027 0.026 -0.025
Wild bootstrap CI-left -0.152 -0.104 -0.179
Wild bootstrap CI-right 0.096 0.146 0.095
HIV testing in pregnancy
DID estimate 0.001 0.047 -0.011
Wild bootstrap CI-left -0.098 -0.052 -0.011
Wild bootstrap CI-right 0.023 0.284 0.237
Iron supplementation
DID estimate 0.012 0.015 0.009
Wild bootstrap CI-left -0.006 -0.018 -0.010
Wild bootstrap CI-right 0.012 0.043 0.011
Facility-based delivery
DID estimate 0.044 0.022 0.055
Wild bootstrap CI-left -0.027 -0.054 -0.027
Wild bootstrap CI-right 0.076 0.122 0.070
PNC1+c visit
DID estimate 0.030 -0.006 0.047
Wild bootstrap CI-left -0.030 -0.093 -0.018
Wild bootstrap CI-right 0.077 0.219 0.169
PNC3+d visits
DID estimate 0.066 0.041 0.072
Wild bootstrap CI-left -0.024 -0.067 -0.017
Wild bootstrap CI-right 0.100 0.102 0.109
Modern family planning methods
DID estimate 0.019 0.076 0.011
Wild bootstrap CI-left -0.030 -0.046 -0.031
Wild bootstrap CI-right 0.077 0.156 0.070
Abbreviations: TTV, tetanus toxoid vaccine; PNC, postnatal care; DID, 
difference-in-differences; ANC, antenatal care.
a At least 4 antenatal care; b At least 2 tetanus doses during pregnancy; c At 
least one postnatal care visit within 6 weeks; d At least 3 postnatal care visits 
within 6 weeks. 
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Table 7. Comparison of Characteristics of Women of Reproductive Age (15-49 Years) Between PBF2, PBF3 and PBF4 Compared With PBF1 at Baseline
Control Variable
PBF2 vs. PBF1 PBF3 vs. PBF1 PBF4 vs. PBF1
Total PBF2 PBF1
Difference
Total PBF3 PBF1
Difference
Total PBF4 PBF1
Difference
n Mean (%) Mean (%) Mean (%) n Mean (%) Mean (%) Mean (%) N Mean (%) Mean (%) Mean (%)
Age
15-20 years 687 20.62 21.72 19.60
2.12
666 19.96 20.36 19.60
0.76
279 20.61 22.45 17.66
4.79**
>21 years 2645 79.38 78.28 80.40 2670 80.04 79.64 80.40 1075 79.39 77.55 82.34
Literacy
Literate 468 14.05 12.86 15.14
-2.28
480 14.39 13.57 15.14
-1.57
102 7.53 7.68 7.29
0.39
Illiterate 2864 85.95 87.14 84.86 2856 85.61 86.43 84.86 1252 92.47 92.32 92.71
Parity
0-3 Pregnancies 1972 59.18 60.61 57.86
2.75
1942 58.21 58.59 57.86
0.73
892 65.88 67.23 63.72
3.51
≥4 Pregnancies 1360 40.82 39.39 42.14 1394 41.79 41.41 42.14 462 34.12 32.77 36.28
Marital status
Married 3172 95.20 96.07 94.39
1.68***
3173 95.11 95.89 94.39
1.50***
1326 97.93 97.24 99.04
-1.80***
Unmarried 160 4.80 3.93 5.61 163 4.89 4.11 5.61 28 2.07 2.76 0.96
Distance to catchment facility
≤5 km 2307 69.24 66.79 71.50
-4.71***
2279 68.32 64.88 71.50
-6.62***
2307 41.51 36.85 48.94
-12.09***
>5 km 1025 30.76 33.21 28.50 1057 31.68 35.12 28.50 1025 58.49 63.15 51.06
Wealth groups
Lowest 20% 514 15.53 14.79 16.01
-1.22
563 16.88 17.81 16.01
1.80
328 24.22 24.97 23.03
1.94
Upper 80% 2818 84.57 85.21 83.99 2773 83.12 82.19 83.99 1026 75.78 75.03 76.97
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing.
T test for differences between PBF2 and PBF1, PBF3 and PBF1 “in 4 regions” and PBF4 and PBF1 “in Boucle du Mouhoun” samples.  ** P < .05, *** P < .01.
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opposite results. It is unfortunate that no data on costs of any 
interventions (PBF, equity measures, gratuité) are available 
which would have allowed policy-makers to put the results 
into a better perspective. Nevertheless, appraising findings 
across our multiple strains of analysis, it appears that while 
PBF produced modest changes compared to status quo, the 
implementation of equity interventions did not generate 
additional benefits compared to PBF alone, neither for women 
in general nor for the poorest women specifically. In a few 
selected instances, PBF combined with equity interventions 
even resulted in worse outcomes than PBF alone. This 
observation is aligned with some published evidence. 
For instance, in Cambodia, coupling PBF with maternity 
vouchers to cover user fees for the poor was also observed not 
to improve service utilization for the poor.27 Two studies from 
Rwanda, where PBF was coupled with CBHI in the analysis, 
showed mixed results. One study found that PBF yielded 
no equity effects,12 while the other study detected pro- poor 
effects for utilization of facility-based deliveries but negative 
equity effect on use of modern family planning methods 
among the poor.8
Before we attempt to uncover reasons for why PBF did not 
Table 8. Comparison of Utilization of Maternal Health Services Between PBF2, PBF3 and PBF4 Compared With PBF1 at Baseline and Endline
Outcome variable Time
PBF2 vs PBF1 PBF3 vs BF1 PBF4 vs PBF1
PBF2
Mean (%)
PBF1
Mean (%) Difference
PBF2
Mean (%)
PBF1 
Mean (%) Difference
PBF2
Mean (%)
PBF1 
Mean (%) Difference
ANC 1st Trimester
Baseline 71.46 66.91 4.55** 69.01 66.91 2.10 66.97 63.04 3.93
Endline 80.11 79.98 0.13 81.01 79.98 1.03 69.54 68.52 1.02
ANC4+a visits
Baseline 43.61 43.47 0.14 42.24 43.47 -1.23 48.97 48.48 0.49
Endline 65.68 68.37 -2.69 64.06 68.37 -4.31** 53.72 54.50 -0.78
TTV2+b
Baseline 63.05 59.41 3.64* 54.54 59.41 -4.87** 67.88 68.23 -0.35
Endline 39.13 42.51 -3.38 42.80 42.51 0.29 42.02 32.96 9.06***
HIV testing in pregnancy 
Baseline 58.93 60.04 -1.11 59.61 60.04 -0.43 74.96 69.89 5.07*
Endline 65.04 62.94 2.10 61.12 62.94 -1.82 47.68 36.21 11.47***
Iron supplementation
Baseline 95.36 94.69 0.67 95.32 94.69 0.63 86.87 89.50 -2.63
Endline 97.50 98.15 -0.65 98.57 98.15 0.42 98.80 99.72 -0.92
Facility-based delivery
Baseline 90.40 86.47 3.93*** 89.88 86.47 3.41** 86.28 88.37 -2.09
Endline 93.54 93.49 0.05 92.43 93.49 -1.06 86.39 87.85 -1.46
PNC1+c visit
Baseline 51.36 51.96 -0.60 56.00 51.96 4.04 46.67 44.13 2.54
Endline 79.10 79.00 0.10 76.75 79.00 -2.25* 70.47 70.28 0.19
PNC3+d visits
Baseline 5.03 5.56 -0.53 4.53 5.56 -1.03 2.11 3.91 -1.80
Endline 16.09 15.15 0.94 12.76 15.15 -2.39 8.81 10.83 -2.02
Modern family planning 
methods
Baseline 12.13 12.05 0.08 10.74 12.05 -1.31 12.11 15.94 -3.83*
Endline 29.02 30.35 -1.33 28.65 30.35 -1.70 29.01 35.46 -6.45**
Abbreviation: TTV, tetanus toxoid vaccine; PNC, postnatal care; PBF, performance-based financing; ANC, antenatal care.
a At least 4 antenatal care; b At least 2 tetanus doses during pregnancy; c At least one postnatal care visit within 6 weeks; d At least 3 postnatal care visits within 
6 weeks.
T test for differences between PBF2 and PBF1, PBF3 and PBF1 “in 4 regions” and PBF4 and PBF1 “in Boucle du Mouhoun” samples. * P < .1, ** P < .05, *** P < .01. 
Table 9. DID Estimates of the Additional Effects of PBF2-PBF4 Compared With PBF1 on the Utilization of Maternal Health Services
Outcome variable
PBF2 vs. PBF1 PBF3 vs. PBF1 PBF4 vs. PBF1
Full Sample
Beta Robust Standard Error Beta Robust Standard Error Beta Robust Standard Error
ANC 1st trimester -0.036 0.028 -0.007 0.030 -0.064 0.049
ANC4+a visits -0.026 0.036 -0.018 0.033 -0.031 0.063
TTV2+b -0.068* 0.038 0.054 0.036 0.131** 0.053
HIV testing in pregnancy 0.030 0.039 -0.012 0.036 0.007 0.066
Iron supplementation -0.010 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.062** 0.023
Facility-based delivery -0.033 0.021 -0.038* 0.022 0.008 0.049
PNC1+c visit 0.012 0.036 -0.067* 0.035 -0.016 0.053
PNC3+d visits 0.018 0.021 -0.010 0.020 -0.022 0.028
Modern family planning methods -0.021 0.024 -0.011 0.025 -0.031 0.043
Abbreviations: TTV, tetanus toxoid vaccine; PNC, postnatal care; DID, difference-in-differences; PBF, performance-based financing; ANC, antenatal care.
a At least 4 antenatal care; b At least 2 tetanus doses during pregnancy; c At least one postnatal care visit within 6 weeks; d At least 3 postnatal care visits within 
6 weeks. * P < .1, ** P < .05.
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Table 10. DID Estimates of the Additional Effects of PBF2-PBF4 Compared With PBF1 on the Utilization of Maternal Health Services by Wealth Subgroups
Outcome variable
PBF2 vs PBF1 PBF3 vs PBF1 PBF4 vs PBF1
Wealth subgroups
Lowest 20% Upper 80% Lowest20% Upper 80% Lowest 20% Upper 80%
Beta Robust Standard Error Beta
Robust Standard 
Error Beta
Robust Standard 
Error Beta
Robust Standard 
Error Beta
Robust Standard 
Error Beta
Robust Standard 
Error
ANC 1st trimester -0.071 0.069 -0.031 0.031 -0.037 0.070 -0.006 0.033 0.073 0.122 -0.087 0.059
ANC4+a visits -0.038 0.082 -0.038 0.038 -0.026 0.082 -0.025 0.037 0.020 0.133 -0.049 0.074
TTV2+b -0.013 0.072 -0.074* 0.040 0.013 0.077 0.074* 0.039 0.099 0.098 0.137** 0.059
HIV testing in pregnancy 0.085 0.088 0.018 0.042 0.041 0.087 -0.023 0.038 -0.064 0.136 0.033 0.067
Iron supplementation -0.004 0.036 -0.015 0.014 -0.074** 0.036 0.011 0.013 0.036 0.073 0.076** 0.029
Facility-based delivery -0.117** 0.048 -0.026 0.023 -0.118** 0.056 -0.015 0.023 -0.014 0.083 0.067 0.050
PNC1+c visit -0.041 0.084 0.028 0.039 -0.103 0.081 -0.050 0.040 -0.241** 0.110 0.014 0.058
PNC3+d visits 0.052 0.052 0.005 0.024 0.076 0.053 -0.024 0.023 -0.069 0.071 -0.016 0.033
Modern family planning methods -0.022 0.054 -0.019 0.027 -0.127** 0.054 0.021 0.026 0.023 0.103 -0.057 0.049
Abbreviations: TTV, tetanus toxoid vaccine; PNC, postnatal care; DID, difference-in-differences; PBF, performance-based financing; ANC, antenatal care.
a At least 4 antenatal care; b At least 2 tetanus doses during pregnancy; c At least one postnatal care visit within 6 weeks; d At least 3 postnatal care visits within 6 weeks. * P < .1, ** P < .05.
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attain the intended equity effects, we shall briefly comment 
on our finding regarding facility-based delivery. While an 
absolute change of 4 percentage points at a significance level 
of 10% may appear to be negligible, it is in fact remarkable 
considering the extremely high baseline utilization values, 
approaching 90%. In addition, we ought to consider that study 
component 1 was largely underpowered due to the constraints 
imposed by the small number of clusters, equivalent to 24 
districts. Since the least-poor drove changes in utilization of 
facility-based delivery, it is plausible to assume that PBF might 
have produced positive changes in quality of service delivery 
necessary to encourage further utilization among those with 
means to be receptive to quality improvements. Further 
research into the impact of PBF on quality of service delivery 
is needed to verify this hypothesis. The positive change 
observed on PNC is less striking, since baseline utilization 
values departed from relatively low levels. Nevertheless, this 
change is highly relevant given that health systems currently 
struggle to increase use of PNC services.28 The general decline 
in coverage of TTV2+ from baseline to endline in both PBF 
and control catchment areas may be due to the fact that by 
the time the endline data were collected, most women in 
the catchment areas had received the 5 doses stipulated by 
government policy and were therefore not eligible to receive 
additional vaccination. This issue arose as the question in the 
survey was set to capture new vaccinations rather than overall 
vaccination coverage. 
Understanding the lack of additional benefit produced 
by the more complex PBF models integrating equity 
interventions compared to standard PBF requires a closer 
inspection of the study context. Endline data collection 
took place between April and June 2017, approximately one 
year after the launch of the national free healthcare policy 
targeting women and children.17 Given a pregnancy recall 
period of 24 months, this means that by the time we collected 
endline data, only a portion of women in our study area had 
been exempted from payment of user fees for all maternal 
care services except modern family planning methods, 
irrespective of whether they lived in the catchment area of a 
standard PBF facility (PBF1) or in areas with an additional 
targeting and subsidization of the ultra-poor (PBF2, PBF3) or 
a CBHI (PBF4) model. 
It could be argued that following the launch of the national 
free healthcare policy, health service use for the specific 
indicators included in our study among the ultra-poor might 
have caught up so fast in PBF1 areas due to the removal of 
the financial barrier to make it impossible for us to detect 
any effect of the PBF equity interventions which might have 
been there prior to June 2016. Our analysis, however, clearly 
indicates that saturation (ie, utilization rates of 100%) was 
not reached for any of the targeted indicators. In addition, 
we note that our effect estimation is by no means invalidated 
by the implementation of the national free healthcare 
policy for maternal health, since pre- and post-test designs 
with independent controls and relying on a DID analytical 
approach are not compromised by presence of group-
invariant factors, such as policies launched across all districts 
in the country simultaneously.29 As such, if the national free 
healthcare policy did bear any effect on service utilization 
(which we do not know because this is beyond the scope of 
this study), it is likely to have done so in all PBF models and 
control districts, not affecting in any way our ability to detect 
differences between PBF and control districts and across PBF 
models. 
Nevertheless, we need to acknowledge that the introduction 
of the national free healthcare policy induced policy-makers 
to adjust the implementation of the equity measures in 
PBF2 and PBF3. Specifically, qualitative interviews with 
key stakeholders revealed that following the launch of 
the national free healthcare policy, the Ministry of Health 
removed additional compensation to healthcare facilities in 
PBF2 and PBF3 for all those services which were included in 
the free healthcare policy benefit package. This means that 
effectively, by the time we collected endline data, PBF2 and 
PBF3 were equivalent to PBF1 in terms of incentives related 
to all maternal care services except modern family planning. 
This could well have demotivated health providers from 
seeking innovative strategies for reaching out to provide the 
poor with the needed services.30 It ought to be noted, however, 
that the introduction of the national free healthcare policy 
only touched the assumed financial mechanisms of the equity 
components, while effects of the sensitization mechanisms 
activated by the targeting exercise should have remained 
constant in PBF2 and PBF3 facility catchment areas only, but 
not in PBF1 facility catchment areas. As such, the introduction 
of the free national healthcare policy could have diluted, but 
not fully removed, the effect of the equity measures, had there 
been one in the first place. 
The fact that we detected a negative effect of PBF2, PBF3, 
and PBF4 compared to PBF1 on selected indicators, especially 
when considering the stratified analysis looking only at the 
poorest, is worrisome. However, this appears to corroborate 
existing evidence pointing at the presence of unintended 
consequences related to the implementation of the 
community-based targeting and related subsidized program 30 
and at general challenges related to the implementation of the 
overall PBF program in the country.31,32 Appraising our current 
findings in light of existing literature suggests that combining 
PBF and equity interventions into a single intervention might 
have resulted in a level of complexity not easily manageable for 
front-line healthcare providers, ultimately leading to effects 
contrary to the ones that had been anticipated. For example, 
evidence shows that health providers introduced ceilings to 
services offered to the ultra-poor as a way of adapting to the 
complexity of the PBF interventions and to the long delays 
in receiving incentive payments, which created financial 
difficulties for health workers.30
Albeit worrisome, the results of our analysis are not per 
se surprising as they align with PBF evidence from other 
settings as well as with prior research assessing the impact 
of earlier targeted exemption policies in Burkina Faso. For 
instance, the national obstetric care policy implemented from 
2007 to 2016 failed to reach the poorest women effectively.33 
A recently published study indicated that lack of fidelity in 
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implementing exemption policies may be due to providers’ 
lack of adequate knowledge in the first place.34 This suggests 
a need to educate providers on the purpose and procedures of 
a given policy to transform them into real agents of change, 
since poor communities are not sufficiently empowered to 
overcome all relevant barriers to access in response to a single 
targeting mechanism. Further qualitative inquiry is needed 
to unravel if and to what extent providers’ understanding of 
the targeted exemptions represented a barrier to the effective 
implementation of equity interventions in Burkina Faso. 
In addition, it is possible that mere removal of user fees 
through targeting was insufficient to enable very poor people 
to seek care. Prior evidence from the region and the country 
specifically clearly points at the presence of important non-
financial barriers to access.33, 35 For example, inequities existed 
in facility-based delivery due to distance to catchment primary 
health facility, literacy, parity and religion.21 There were also 
inequities in utilization rates for ANC4+ visits due to distance 
to catchment primary health facility, literacy, parity, religion 
and marital status and for PNC1+ visit due to distance to 
catchment primary health facility, age and religion.21 Since the 
PBF program did not address these other sources of inequity, 
other than household wealth, arguably they still constituted 
barriers to uptake of essential maternal health services by the 
poorest women. Still, further research is needed to unravel 
why in some settings equity interventions are not effective 
in narrowing equity gaps while in others, such as Tanzania,10 
combining PBF and targeted exemptions resulted in greater 
service use among the poor in public health facilities. This is 
in line with Renmans et al, who have observed that although 
PBF has received increasing attention, a lot remains unknown 
about the exact mechanisms triggered by PBF arrangements.36 
As such, they have called for more research to examine the 
exact mechanisms through which not only incentives, but also 
ancillary components operate. Such knowledge is necessary 
to understand and appreciate the effectiveness, desirability 
and appropriateness of PBF as a possible tool towards health 
systems strengthening in LMICs.
Methodological Considerations
Our study is not without limitations. First, since the 
intervention took place within a real-life setting, we cannot 
rule-out that other interventions with similar objectives took 
place alongside PBF, especially in control districts. Hence, 
we cannot estimate the extent to which our comparator 
really reflects status quo utilization rates. Second, we need to 
acknowledge the fact that women identified in our study as 
the poorest do not exactly match the ones identified by the 
community-based targeting procedure of the program as 
such. Hence, the reader ought to be aware that our findings 
illustrate the impact on the lowest quintile in general and not 
on targeted individuals specifically. Parallel research efforts 
based on a different dataset are ongoing to look at the impact 
of the equity interventions specifically on targeted individuals. 
Third, the power to detect impact in study component 1 
was limited by the relatively low number of clusters. This 
limitation was noted well in advance, when the overall PBF 
impact evaluation study was being designed, but financial 
and policy challenges made it impossible to increase the 
number of clusters, and hence it was agreed amongst all key 
stakeholders to live with this limitation. Fourth, the purposive 
selection of the districts represents a potential threat to 
external validity, more specifically to the generalizability of 
the results emerging from study component 1. Precisely, the 
purposive selection of the districts does not allow us to make 
inferences about the possible effects of PBF in districts with 
higher baseline values, hence we need to exercise caution in 
generalizing the results of this study to other contexts. This 
purposive selection, however, does not represent a threat in 
terms of the internal validity of the DID analysis, since it does 
not violate the basic assumptions of the DID model.29,37 Fifth, 
as discussed extensively earlier, the modifications which 
were operated to the PBF design following the introduction 
of the national free healthcare policy could have potentially 
contributed to diluting, but not eliminating, the effect of PBF, 
had there been one in the first place. 
 
Conclusion
PBF is being implemented in LMICs and sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular as a response to weak health systems 
performance. Although rapidly growing, evidence regarding 
its effectiveness is still very mixed. Evidence regarding PBF 
equity impacts on use of health services and maternal health 
is particularly scarce and, when available, it is mixed, in some 
cases conflicting. Our results indicate that even well-designed 
PBF interventions which integrate explicit equity components 
are not sufficient to overcome inequities in health service 
use. As such, our results confirm the need for additional 
interventions reaching beyond the financial realm to ensure 
access to care by the ultra-poor. In addition, our findings 
suggest that changing policy environments inevitably affect 
the way an intervention, in this case PBF combined with 
equity measures, is carried out and hence should be explicitly 
acknowledged when appraising effects. 
Lastly, we would like to reiterate the importance of carefully 
monitoring and measuring the equity impact of interventions 
targeted at improving access and quality of service delivery 
as an integral element of SDG 3. The experience of the PBF 
program in Burkina Faso provides a clear illustration of how 
even well-intended and accurately designed interventions 
may fail to achieve their objective due to a variety of contextual 
elements that shape implementation in unattended manners. 
As such, greater attention to context and competing policies 
ought to be paid in designing strategies that aim at building 
synergies between supply and demand to overcome existing 
inequities.
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